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Abstract
Moving beyond the concern with causes of radicalization, this article
explores the transformative aspect of radicalization within Hizb ut-Tahrir
(The Liberation Party). The personal narratives obtained from this
ethnographic fieldwork are placed into a frame of reference related to
how radicalization occurs within Hizb ut-Tahrir. Gaining insight into this
social phenomenon required an ‘ethnographic’ approach, which allowed
me to study members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in their natural setting. My access
to Hizb ut-Tahrir put me in the unique position of being able to gather
the biographical information required to study radicalization. In essence,
I sought to acquire, from within the group setting, an understanding of
how members become indoctrinated within Hizb ut-Tahrir. As the
findings reveal, Hizb ut-Tahrir radicalization is a narrow cognitive
process that has distinct behavioural outcomes.
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Introduction  
Radical Islam remains a fringe ideology within the United Kingdom, yet its 
attractiveness continues to grow amongst some younger Muslim 
practitioners.  In Britain, the rise of radical Islam has been spearhead by 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a vocal radical Islamist group that has been active in 
the UK for over 30 years.  Since the group’s arrival in the UK, its 
ideological agenda has centered on recruiting young people.  The 
demographic makeup of UK membership illustrates this youth bulge, as 85 
per cent of members are below the age of 30 and 96.3 per cent were 
recruited before the age of 25.1 
 
The age composition of HT membership is not unexpected, as countless 
popular movements attract young activists.2  However, the focus is not to 
determine why some young British Muslims join HT, but rather to 
understand the method of radicalization within HT.  It is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly how HT indoctrinates some young Muslims within its 
organization, because it operates in a clandestine manner.  As a result, 
trying to gain close proximity to HT radicals is an incredibly complicated 
task.  After lengthy negotiations with senior HT officials, I gained access to 
observe the organizational structure of HT.  I witnessed first-hand the 
transformative consequence of HT radicalization, as young novices 
gradually adopted the ideology of HT. 
 
History of Hizb ut-Tahrir  
Hizb ut-Tahrir came into existence over half a century ago in the West 
Bank.  The founder of HT, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, witnessed the 
establishment of a Jewish homeland in the heart of his birthplace.  
Decades before, he witnessed the West rampage through the Muslim 
world, solidifying non-Muslim supremacy.  He was disgusted with the 
hegemony of Western culture, which he blamed for weakening the Muslim 
world.3  Western culture played a key role in evoking HTs ideological 
awakening.  According to al-Nabhani, the only way to neutralize the 
dominance of Western culture was to enact HT ideology.4  Hizb ut-Tahrir 
ideology is a divine doctrine from which a system emanates.   
 
                                                 
1 Wali, F., Radicalism Unveiled (Farnham: Ashgate Publishers, 2013), 116. 
2 Engel, S.M., The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and 
Lesbian Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 39. 
3 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Islamic State (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2002a), 
4. 
4 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Al-Takattul al-Hizbi (The Party Structure) (London: Al-
Khilafah Publications, 2002b), 13. 
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In its practical formation, HT ideology is fashioned from the Islamic 
legislative sources, which generate a host of solutions to temporal and 
metaphysical problems.  According to HT, there are three distinct state 
ideologies: “Democratic secularism, communism, and the Islamic 
system.”5  The goal of HT is to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey 
it to the whole of humanity.   
 
We know little about how this clandestine movement operates, in terms of 
its structure and recruitment, but since its conception in the Middle East, 
it has progressively sought to expand.  It is surprising how little attention 
this group has received in the academic literature.  As a result, HT’s 
activities have gone largely unnoticed, allowing them to establish a 
popular base of support among some young Muslims in Britain. 
 
Methodology 
During my initial encounters with HT members, I noticed that, on the 
surface, they appeared thoroughly, as evidenced by their dress, language, 
and leisure activities.  However, these young men had become radicalized 
by HT ideology, turning against liberal and secular values.  I wanted to 
find out what processes contributed to this change.  The work of fellow 
researchers appeared to be characterized by their fascination for 
radicalization, from a distance.6  A major reason for this neglect has been 
the difficulty in collecting primary data as Islamist groups operate in a 
clandestine manner.7 
 
This begs the question, how does one study HT?  To begin, what 
distinguishes this research from other scholarly work is the ethnographic 
approach.  In 2009, I started my fieldwork by attending local HT activities.  
After spending several months interacting with new recruits and members, 
I started to observe the Halaqah (private study circle).  In total, I had 
access to three separate Halaqah’s, consisting of 22 novices and four HT 
members.  The fieldwork lasted for 12 months, and within this time, I 
gained insight into the inner workings of HT radicalization.  In particular, 
the techniques they employ to indoctrinate new activists.  Adopting an 
ethnographic approach gave me an opportunity to study the activities of 
group members in their natural surroundings.8  
                                                 
5 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Nidham al-Islam (The System of Islam) (London: Al-
Khilafah Publications, 2002c), 24.   
6 For example: Roy, 2002; Crayton, 1983; Crenshaw, 1981; Jenkins, 1979; Post, 1990). 
7 Academics have recently turned to ex-members, as a means to understand the 
radicalization process.  In Radicalism Unveiled, I outline the methodological 
problems with referring to autobiographical accounts of ex-members (such asEd 
Husain).  Refer to Wali, F., Radicalism Unveiled. 
8 Garfinkel, H., “Re-specification: Evidence for locally produced, naturally 
accountable phenomena of order, logic, reason, meaning, method,” in G.  Button 
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The approach used to acquire data from my participants relied extensively 
on a large network of contacts within HT.  This enabled me to capture the 
opinions of the members, allowing me to articulate their views related to 
the radicalization process.  This provided me with insight, as a participant, 
of the inner workings of the organizational structure.  This, furthermore, 
made my fieldwork easier because I was not considered an outsider, and 
was given open access to members and to HT culture.  However, during 
the course of my fieldwork, I grew increasingly concerned with the 
problem of ‘selective perception.’9  In other words, as Ray explains, if one 
studies a single process extensively, then representativeness of the sample 
may be compromised.10  In order to counteract this potential problem, I 
observed three separate Halaqah’s, enabling me to experience the same 
social phenomenon with different novices.     
 
In addition to the ethnographic work, I conducted a series of in-depth 
interviews with HT novices and members.  In order to understand how HT 
radicalized early recruits required conducting interviews with Farid 
Kassim and Omar Bakri Muhammad, as they were the founders of the UK 
branch in the early 1980s.11  These interviews revealed how the first study 
cells formed, providing insight into the purpose and strategy of HT 
radicalization.  As the men disclosed, the techniques they developed for 
indoctrinating young novices formed the wider strategy for HT Britain, 
which has been in effect for over three decades.   
 
Radicalization 
Before commencing this study, I felt somewhat confident that once I 
gained inner access to HT, at the operational level, I would easily be able 
to locate instances of radicalization.  Instead, as I acquired access, I found 
it extremely difficult to isolate specific techniques constituting 
‘radicalization.’  So, it became apparent I had to obtain clarity concerning 
what I meant when I claimed members of HT had been ‘indoctrinated’.  I 
felt the best way to do this would be to generate abstract comparisons with 
other behavioral processes such as ‘brainwashing’ and ‘conditioning’.  
Wilson makes an interesting distinction between the two based on 
                                                 
(ed.), Ethnomethology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
9 Ray, William, Methods Toward a Science of Behavior and Experience (Wadsworth, 
CENGAGE Learning, 2009), 297. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The interviews with Farid Kassim and Omar Bakri were conducted in 2004 as part 
of my research into the history of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK.  Refer to: Wali, F., 
Radicalism Unveiled. 
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dichotomizing belief and behavior.12  This would imply radicalization fits 
together with beliefs, while conditioning relates to behavioral process.  In 
simple terms, ‘we condition people to do something; we indoctrinate them 
to believe something’.13  This distinction is quite apt for HT radicalization, 
as novices freely join HT and actively agree to undergo radicalization.  
Therefore, as will be revealed, radicalization within HT is a group activity 
lead by the indoctrinator, which takes place in the Halaqah (private study 
circle).  It is the indoctrinator’s primary function to inculcate his novices 
with the correct ideological belief system.  Therefore, radicalization occurs 
within the Halaqah, while behavioral modification and conditioning 
occurs outside of the Halaqah. 
 
The Difficulty of Explaining the Radicalization Process  
Radicalization, as a process, is not easily explained.  There are many 
different ways of framing the subject of radicalization, a good starting 
point is social psychology.  This is because social psychology, as can be 
inferred from its description, combines the ways in which both social and 
mental processes determine identity.14  Radicalization, in a social 
psychology context, refers to a considerable departure from traditional 
ideals, constituting a full and real change at the root of the personality.15  
This definition offers a good starting point, but this definition needs to be 
amended because it is incomplete and far too general in its scope and 
application.  For instance, the same definition of radicalization could be 
given to those who undergo a religious conversion.  According to Rambo, 
there are two transformations that are central to the conversion process: 
“total change in all other aspects of life, and a new awareness of the well-
being of others.”16  In general, the act of religious conversion might have a 
similar result to radicalization, but these two forms of identity change are 
not identical. 
 
Despite accumulating a vast array of new data regarding HT members and 
their backgrounds, it is still extremely difficult to pinpoint precisely how 
radicalization occurs, since radicalization is a ‘complex process that does 
not follow a linear path’.17  The immediate concern here is to provide a 
                                                 
12 John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality” in Concepts of indoctrination: 
philosophical essays (New York: Routledge, 1972), 17-18 
13 Snook, I.  A., Concepts of indoctrination: philosophical essays (New York: 
Routledge, 1972), 2. 
14 Rom, H.  and Lamb, R., The Dictionary of Personality and Social Psychology 
(eds.), (MIT Press, 1986).    
15 Popplestone, J.  A.  and McPherson, M.  W., Dictionary of Concepts in General 
Psychology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).   
16 Lewis Rambo, “Religious Conversion,” in Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: 
Macmillan, 1987), 77.   
17 Pargeter, A., “North African Immigrants in Europe and Political Violence,” Studies 
on Conflict and Terrorism 29: 737. 
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definition of radicalization before any serious study of the topic can be 
made.  Firstly, I prefer to use the idiom HT radicalization, instead of more 
generic terms like radicalization.  This is because from social constructivist 
theory, ‘framing’ of radicalization draws upon a collective phenomenon 
that is essentially contextualized to two key agents: the group and the 
novice.18  Thus, the definition of HT radicalization crafted in this article 
can be separated into three distinct parts: (1) a new cognitive perspective 
is engineered based on HT ideology that is (2) internalized, so (3) the 
Hizbi personality can be created (collective group identity).19 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir Ideology: Engineering Cognitive Change  
The most fundamental part of identity transformation in HT is the deep 
process of radicalization, which provides a new cognitive perspective with 
which to view the social world.  At this point, I want to look briefly at 
cognitive theory, in order to clarify its meaning in the context of 
radicalization.  Social cognitive theory defines behavior as a reciprocal 
interaction between an internal emotional state and triggers that are 
available in the environment.20  Social psychologists have long tried to 
identify the key cognitive and motivational changes that occur within 
individuals when they become group members.  The radical group is the 
primary setting for the creation of a new cognitive perspective, because 
members are willing to ‘bend towards group expectation’.21  This 
explanation shows the strong interplay between individuals and groups, 
enabling HT to change the cognitive perspective of members.  Wiktorowicz 
in her study of Al-Muhajiroun, now disbanded, discovered contact with 
the radical group often required a ‘cognitive opening’.22  This cognitive 
opening is a gateway to the wholesale transformation of previously held 
beliefs.  According to Wiktorowicz, this is often inspired by identity crisis, 
which renders the recipient more susceptible to radical ideology.  Thus, 
early fascination with the radical group often leads to a ‘cognitive opening’, 
activating a process of ‘religious seeking’.23  The triggers for this opening 
are multifaceted and greatly hinge on the experiences of the individual, 
making them vulnerable to the movement. 
 
                                                 
18 Snow, David A., E.  Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K.  Wordon, and Robert D.  
Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51: 464-81. 
19 Wali, F.  Radicalism Unveiled, 44. 
20 Bandura, Albert, Social Learning Theory (New York: General Learning Press, 
1977).   
21 Newcomb, T.M.  and Swanson, G.E., Readings in social psychology (ed.) (New 
York: Rinehart and Winston, 1953), 221. 
22 Wiktorowicz, Q., Radical Islam Rising: Muslim extremism in the West, (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 19. 
23 Ibid. 
Wali: Functionality of Radicalization
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
 107 
This view of cognitive change in perception within a group setting involves 
members privately and publicly adopting this as their own choice.24  As a 
result, individuals are categorized, and placed in an in-group.  This 
membership is then internalized by members as an aspect of their 
identity.25  In this respect, the basis for a member’s self-definition changes 
within the group, allowing his or her personal identity to be submerged 
into a collective identity.26  According to Triplett, moving from a state of 
social exclusion to a group setting can drastically diminish one’s sense of 
individuality.27  Similarly, Newcomb found that increased interaction with 
other members prompts individuals to change their attitudes in 
accordance with the group consensuses.28  In other words, for the 
cognitive transformation to take effect the individual must align his 
viewpoint with HT ideology. 
 
Internalization and Creating the Hizbi Personality  
Internalization is a general term for the process of incorporating concepts 
and behaviors into one’s self, and embedding features of the external 
world into the internal world.29  This internal world is strongly influenced 
by group involvement, actively imposing constraints on behavior and 
reshaping the external world.  In other words, when a novice joins HT, his 
or her perceptions of others change in accordance with HT’s perceptions, 
allowing him or her to internalize the collective HT ideology.  This 
internalization of ideas and beliefs actively occurs through the culturing 
process, which completely alters the disposition and creates group loyalty.  
This transformative phase is integral to HT radicalization, as it infuses the 
individual to the group. 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a significant actor in the development of a new cognitive 
and behavioral disposition, especially as it is the sole interpreter of the 
radical ideology.  Within the group setting, the novice is indoctrinated into 
thinking in accordance with the group perspective.  This is manifested in a 
new way of viewing the social world, which may contradict established 
                                                 
24 Appelbaum, R.  P., Carr, D., Duneir, M., Giddens, A.  “Conformity, Deviance, and 
Crime,” in Introduction to Sociology (New York, NY: W.  W.  Norton & Company, 
2009).   
25 Tajfel, H., Human Groups and Social Categories (Studies in Social Psychology 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).   
26 Post, Jerrold M.  “The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour,” International 
Journal of Group Psychotherapy 36:2 (1986).  
27 Triplett, Norman, “The dynamogenic factors in peace making and competition,” 
American Journal of Psychology 9 (1898). 
28 Newcomb, T.M.  and Swanson, G.E., Readings in social psychology (ed.) (New 
York: Rinehart and Winston, 1953). 
29 Meissner, W.  W., Internalization in Psychoanalysis (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1981). 
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convention.30  Thus, the first significant aspect of HT radicalization relates 
to the establishment of a new cognitive perspective that reflects the group 
identity.  According to Sherif and Sherif, the group setting has a powerful 
influence on individual behavior, justifying the ‘in-group’s negative 
opinions of the out-group’.31  Similarly, David and Turner argue, in a 
group setting people tend to ‘depersonalize’ and ‘stereotype’ themselves 
and other people.32  Consequently, HT members focus more on the 
similarities between themselves, which makes it easier to impose 
differences between them and the ‘others’.  More importantly, the new 
cognitive perspective, gained in a group environment, spawns greater self-
esteem and empowerment.33  Empowerment is an essential part of the 
radicalization process, increasing the ideological strength of individuals; 
the empowered develop a greater sense of confidence in their own 
abilities.  In the context of HT, for example, the member must ‘adopt the 
opinions of the group, its thoughts, and its constitution by word and 
deed’.34  This means that anyone who becomes a member of HT has to 
pledge an oath to adopt everything HT calls for even if he or she is not 
convinced of some of it.35  Taken as a whole, the theory of HT 
radicalization will encompass individual and collective life, identifying the 
shifting patterns of behavior that take place at the root of a personality. 
 
Before Radicalization: Targeting the Disaffected  
Omar Bakri, former leader of HT Britain, argued that young British 
Muslims struggled to contend with their identity.  This perpetuated two 
completely opposing personalities, which he dubbed, the “Bobby and 
Abdullah syndrome.”  At home, the ‘Abdullah persona’ would revert to an 
ethnic association, speaking the language of his parents and adhering to 
their custom.  However, outside the home the ‘Bobby persona’ would 
materialize.  As Bakri declared, “he would drink, go clubbing, and be fully 
integrated [British culture].”36  This apparent ‘clash of cultures’, during the 
early stages of socialization, would be key to HT radicalization.  The 
engineering of radicals required finding young people that had become 
                                                 
30 Hassan, Steven, Releasing the Bonds: Empowering People to Think for Themselves 
(Aitan Publishing Company, 2001) 
31 Sherif, M., and Sherif, C. W., Social Psychology (Int.  Rev.  Ed.) (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1969). 
32 David, B., & Turner, J.  C., “Studies in self-categorization and minority conversion: 
The ingroup minority in intragroup and intergroup contexts,” British Journal of 
Social Psychology 38 (1999). 
33 Tajfel, H & Turner, J.  C., “An Integrative theory of inter-group conflict,” in W. G. 
Austin and S. Worchel, The social psychology of inter-group relations (Monterey, 
CA: Brooks, 1979).  
34 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Hizb ut-Tahrir (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1998), 
1. 
35 Ibid, 2. 
36 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004. 
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disaffected, during their socialization, because these individuals displayed 
greater motivation towards HT ideology.  If socialization were an integral 
aspect of personality development, shaping and informing identity, then 
what effect would adverse socialization have?  According to Bakri, the 
issue of racism Passive voice to target those young people that had 
experienced this in their childhood utilizing the psychological pain; they 
felt, as a means to radicalize them in adulthood.  By exploiting a key 
developmental stage HT were able to redirect a recruit’s negative feelings 
to a radical treatment. 
 
Those young Muslims that had suffered through their socialization 
developed dysfunctional identity structures that lead to a proclivity for 
greater belonging.  HT recruits developed through the life cycle struggling 
to adjust their identity, lacking the ability to control their surroundings, 
which perpetuated a deep feeling of frustration.  The early recruits, in one 
way or another, all experienced some form of social difficulty that marred 
their socialization.  The research presented in this article suggests the HT 
elite sought to establish radical cells, comprising almost exclusively of 
young Muslims.  To facilitate this process, the founding members 
methodically targeted ethnic minorities, arousing a sense of conflict with 
the dominant culture.  This would be achieved by exploiting the dual 
aspect of socialization received by minority groups.  Bakri explained how 
the experiences of young Muslims being racially attacked, in the cases he 
observed, caused them to be “distrustful of Kuffar (non-Muslims).”37  
 
Radicalizing the Novice: The Halaqah system 
Members of HT believe their organization is distinct, because it is 
seemingly regulated by detailed protocols that have been codified into a 
set of adopted rules.  These protocols allow HT leadership to allocate tasks 
at every level, but in actuality, it limits the novices from rationalizing 
activity.  Omar Bakri claimed he built all the cells and placed the new 
recruits into the Halaqah, which is a private study group comprising of 
one member and five novices.38  The systematic radicalization of the 
novice occurred in the Halaqah, as it helped solidify core beliefs and 
established dependency on HT.  The Halaqah became the static point of 
radicalization, as it placed the novice within a closed setting that removed 
them from external anchor, allowing inculcation of HT ideology.  Before 
entering the Halaqah, the novice has an established set of ideas related to 
society and life, forming the ideological point of reference for their 
existence.  However, when placed in the Halaqah with other novices, the 
ideological point of reference fragments as the HT member engineers a 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.  
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new ideological viewpoint.  As Wilson asserts, implanting beliefs through 
authoritative figures can replace reason, making it a form of illegitimate 
radicalization.39 
 
When I began observing the Halaqah process, I was concerned that my 
presence may unintentionally distort its normal function.  However, as 
time passed, I gradually gained acceptance, allowing me to observe the 
Halaqah in its natural environment.  By observing the Halaqah in its 
everyday setting, I was able to experience the cognitive and behavioral 
changes experienced by novices over a 12-month period.  Initially, I 
attributed this change to brainwashing and conditioning.  However, this 
according to Winn would suggest that the novices were ‘unaware’ of the 
Halaqah purpose.40  Yet, as observed, novices join the Halaqah process 
willingly.  As AQ (novice) declared, “the H [Halaqah] removes ideological 
contamination and builds the correct ideological foundation.”41  This 
suggests novices acknowledge the transformative agenda of the 
Halaqah.42  
 
As Lifton discovered, brainwashing is not an all-powerful transformative 
method that can achieve “total control over the human mind.”43  This 
suggests brainwashing may not be an appropriate description of the 
Halaqah process, because as Farid explained, “we’re not creating mindless 
automatons…we want ideologues.”44  The Halaqah is the location where 
novices are ideologically reformatted, having their thoughts and behavior 
realigned to HT ideology.  Brainwashing may seek a similar outcome, but 
it employs a range of persuasive techniques as Lifton’s study of Chinse 
communists revealed.45  In this regard, radicalization as a descriptive 
measure fits the aims and method of the Halaqah, as HT radicalization 
centers on the novice’s ideological framework. 
 
In the early 1980s, Omar Bakri conducted the first UK Halaqah’s, 
culturing the first generation of HT recruits.  In the Halaqah, Omar Bakri 
went about transforming the novice, in a holistic fashion, rendering them 
with a Hizbi personality.  This would entail attaching the thoughts and 
                                                 
39 John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality” in Concepts of indoctrination: 
philosophical essays (New York: Routledge, 1972), 14-17. 
40 Winn, D., The Manipulated Mind: Brainwashing, Conditioning, and 
Indoctrination (Malor Books, 2012), 4. 
41 AQ made these comments during a group discussion held on April 7, 2009. 
42 This article does not report the psychological reactions novices had to the Halaqah, 
as the goal was to understand the mechanics of the radicalization process.  In follow up 
articles, we will provide insight into the psychological impact of the Halaqah process. 
43 Lifton, Robert J., Thought reform and the psychology of totalism: a study of 
Brainwashing in China (The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 4.   
44 Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004. 
45 Lifton, Robert J.  Thought reform and the psychology of totalism.  
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ideas to specific modes of behavior, as to generate a change, which 
apparently “developed a deep and profound way of thinking.”46  The 
Halaqah process became the central mechanism to sustain the purity of 
HT ideology by dispersing the ideology throughout the party cells.  Omar 
Bakri recounting how he established the Halaqah system in the early 
1980s stated the Halaqah enabled him to mobilize HT into active cells, 
which through constant replication gave birth to newer cells across the 
country.47 
 
Omar Bakri assigned great importance to the Halaqah process, bestowing 
serious attention to its precise undertaking.  The Halaqah had one 
primary function to indoctrinate the novice in a concentrated manner.  
The Halaqah was used to indoctrinate the novice with a shared belief 
system, forming a single unit of members, embodying HT ideology.  
According to Farid Kassim, senior member of HT, the Halaqah focused on 
developing the ‘aqlya’ (mentality) and the ‘nafsyya’ (disposition) of the 
novice.48  The process of constructing the ‘nafsyya’ (disposition) among 
the novices was essential, because HT activity was dependent on the 
commitment of its new members.  Omar Bakri believed the ‘nafsyya’ 
would determine the ‘level of sacrifice and commitment’ members 
allocated to the party cause.49  Omar Bakri was the main Mushrif 
(instructor) of the early recruits, regulating the Halaqah and assuming full 
responsibility for its supervision.  The Halaqah was configured in a way 
that made it differ entirely from the academic and philosophical styles of 
teaching.  According to Omar Bakri, the academic style had been rejected 
as a means of disseminating HT ideology because it detracted the novice 
from HT’s ideological aim and it did not “build Islamic personalities.”50  
Importantly, the numbers admitted into the Halaqah, by Bakri, was 
deliberately restricted and organized broadly around the same level.  Bakri 
claimed the academic style “lacks productivity.”51  For instance, he felt 
culturing novices in large classes prevented the Mushrif from tailoring HT 
ideology to the varying strengths and levels of each novice.   
 
The Structuring of the Halaqah:  
The Halaqah has received special consideration in HT literature, as it is 
the main device used to engineer the Hizbi personality.  According to 
Omar Bakri, “if the Halaqah was organized in an incorrect manner” then 
                                                 
46 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004. 
49 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
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the culturing process would decline.52  Thus, he formulated a 
comprehensive set of preventive procedures that would safeguard the 
Halaqah process.  First, the preliminary stage of acceptance would be used 
to maintain the integrity of the Halaqah, Bakri explained.  In this respect, 
four standard guidelines would be used to establish in the novice a general 
awareness of the party culture, which a prospective novice had to obtain as 
a perquisite for entry into the Halaqah.  At this stage of entry, HT makes a 
crucial distinction between acquiring a general awareness and that of 
conviction; the latter is only procured after a deep process of radicalization 
through many years of study within the Halaqah.  In contrast, a general 
awareness entails a basic acceptance that these auxiliary thoughts are 
correct and require action.   
 
For this purpose, Bakri developed four entry-level guidelines that had to 
be fulfilled to gain admittance to the Halaqah, which is designed to extend 
beyond energetic zeal.  First, to consolidate, a novice must accept Islam as 
a complete way of life that addresses all temporal and spiritual problems.  
Second, the need to abide by the Hukm Shari (Islamic law) in all remits of 
life must be demonstrated, especially related to the establishment of the 
Khilafah (Islamic State).  Third, the novice must agree that the work to 
establish the Khilafah is a political action.  Finally, admittance cannot take 
place until the novice acknowledges HT as the only Islamic party correctly 
working to establish Islam.  The novice prior to admittance into the 
Halaqah must agree on these four areas. 
 
The preliminary discussions with the novice would usually take place 
through individual contact or in small public circles, commonly referred to 
as an intermediate Halaqah.  The intermediate Halaqah, Farid explained, 
would consist of “three or four circles addressing each of the guidelines.”  
Omar Bakri made it clear to the new recruits they had consented to ‘work’ 
for HT.  This was important, as Farid explained, because HT strongly 
discourages the use of the term ‘study’.  Rather, ‘emphasis was given to 
work’, as HT does not invite people for scholarly study, instead they seek 
ideological activists who will energetically work to establish the objectives 
of HT.53  According to HT, Islam is a religious and political ideology, 
within which sovereignty belongs exclusively to God.  This means human 
agents do not have the mandate to govern, making man-made ideological 
systems invalided.  This is why HT rejects participation within the political 
system, and thus requires the recruitment of activists willing to operate 
outside of the system.   
 
                                                 
52 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004. 
53 Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004. 
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The new recruits on their admission to HT were explained two further 
issues by Omar Bakri.  First, the work to establish Khilafah required clear 
ideas about Islam.  According to HT, Islam is a divine doctrine from which 
a complete system of human governance emanates.  This ideological 
interpretation seeks the holistic enforcement of the Islamic legislative 
system in society (e.g. enactment of Sharia Law), as Islam is the only 
source of worldly guidance.  Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology view’s Islam as a 
complete system of human governance, deciphering all human problems 
(e.g. political, economic, social, and ethical).  This makes it mandatory for 
human beings to implement the ideology of Islam.  In order to acquire this 
ideological understanding of Islam necessitated committing to studying 
these ideas within the Halaqah system.   
 
Second, the novice must attend the Halaqah regularly, being punctual and 
committing themselves to two hours a week: non-compliance is haram 
(sinful act).   
 
The Halaqah has been ordained with special administrative consideration, 
as it implants the ideology within the novice.  This means its regulation 
must be conducted in a strict and consistent manner.  For this reason, the 
Mushrif assumes direct responsibility for the supervision of the Halaqah.  
The Mushrif, for example, must submit a detailed Halaqah report to the 
Masool (area supervisor) after every Halaqah informing him of the 
progression of each novice.  Within this report, the Mushrif documents 
tardiness.  If a novice is late on a regular basis, then the Masool will take 
action.  As Omar Bakri explained, ‘lateness cannot be tolerated’, because it 
reduces the importance of HT’s work.54   
 
The Halaqah has distinct stylistic rules.  The Halaqah should be given in a 
manner that influences the novice to initiate thinking and feeling.  The 
Halaqah facilitates the novice to construct his or her own views rationally 
and freely.  This suggests radicalization is an ‘intentional activity’.55  
However, this ignores the Mushrif, who is the indoctrinator.  The Mushrif 
guides the novice to arrive at the correctness of HT ideology, but this 
should not occur through blind obedience.  The Mushrif assumes full 
responsibility for explaining the content of HT ideology, which is 
proceeded by a discussion on the concepts raised to gain clarity.  
Importantly, HT enforced strict guidelines on the Mushrif, for instance, he 
alone could answer questions, without exception, as the credibility of the 
Mushrif would be brought into question if a particular novice answered 
questions on his behalf.  Hizb ut-Tahrir administrative law had gone to 
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meticulous depths to explain every minute detail related to the Halaqah.  
According to Farid, detailed guidelines had even been documented about 
the mannerisms of the Mushrif, especially when delivering a Halaqah: 
“The Mushrif should be quiet and soft spoken, and control his nerves 
during questions, discussion, and explanation and be cautious not to get 
angry or agitated.”56  Hizb ut-Tahrir has given the Halaqah the highest 
seriousness, as it indoctrinates novices.   
 
Beginning a New Halaqah 
Omar Bakri asserted each Halaqah was given significant attention, during 
the development of the early Halaqahs, especially concerning their 
preparation and administration.  In this respect, Omar Bakri requested all 
Mushrif’s to act like a “father figure to the novice,” guiding and fostering 
the burden of the novice’s development.57  The Halaqah built the Hizbi 
personality.  This ideological remolding starts with changing the cognitive 
perspective, which entails removing the remnants of the old ideological 
viewpoint.  The novice grew up in a secular environment, exposed to an 
array of non-Islamic standards.  The western ideological viewpoint became 
the basis for action.  For this reason, the first phase of Halaqah was 
assigned to studying the book Nidham al-Islam (system of Islam).  In 
particular, the first chapter deals with belief, while the second confronts 
the topic of fate and destiny.  These two chapters were used to establish a 
new ideological framework that would motivate the novice, by altering his 
entire outlook.  The intellectual subject matter of the Halaqah helped 
cultivate a sense of collective radicalization.58  In contrast to peer 
discussions, the Halaqah drilled ideological content into the novice.  As 
one member explained: “Halaqah is a building process…corrupt concepts 
are destroyed and the correct concepts built.”59  This suggests the goal of 
the Halaqah is to radicalize the individual.  I need to stress the HT 
activists I spoke to all objected to my use of the term radicalization, as they 
collectively felt it implied a lack of rationality.  According to Crenshaw, 
radicalization can be generated through rational and non-rational 
methods.60  In the Halaqah, the Mushrif rigidly regulates the discussion, 
making the Halaqah a contrived social space. 
 
Secondary Radicalization: Pursuance 
In the early 1980s, the first Halaqahs were designed to change the 
sentiments and inclinations of the novice because, as Omar Bakri 
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59 Ibid. 
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explained, “they were brought up in a corrupt western society.”61  
However, Omar Bakri realized the Halaqah was a short medium, as it is 
conducted once a week for two hours.  To build a conceptual framework in 
a clear and precise manner required substantial ‘pursuance outside of the 
Halaqah.  Pursuance entailed following the novice outside of the Halaqah 
in a natural way, to see whether they had assimilated the concepts of the 
Halaqah into their daily life.  According to Omar Bakri, the Mushrif would 
visit the novice ‘in his home or take him to the Mosque’, bringing him 
closer to the novice.62  At this early stage, converts to Islam were treated 
differently, as Mushrif’s were required to give more time to them, because 
they had to be taught the fundamentals of religious belief.  Through the 
Halaqah Omar Bakri sought to create an environment of ‘spirit’ that 
connected the novice to God, via HT.  The new members were key to this 
pure environment; they had to lead by example.  Therefore, the Mushrif 
was sanctioned with the duty to consolidate his Halaqah into a unified 
cell.  In this respect, the process of radicalization occurred within the peer 
group setting. 
 
In order to understand pursuance, I was able to observe the interplay 
between Mushrif and novice outside of the Halaqah.  In essence, novices 
formed closed peer group bonds, which reinforced HT ideology.  As Nina 
(novice) said, ‘practicing was hard early on because you’d be told what to 
do and how to do it’.63  This interface seems disproportionate, as the 
behavioral norms within the peer group are regulated by HT ideology.  In 
addition, pursuance developed close relationships with amongst the 
novices and the Mushrif, making radicalization easier.  As Sara explained: 
“I really trusted the sisters; we became close and I revealed a lot to them 
about myself.”64  Familiarity within peer groups cultivates ideological 
socialization.65  Peer socialization was an important developmental stage 
in the pursuance process, as it gives the novice a framework to view and 
interact with the social world.  The novices I observed seemed fully 
engaged within the peer group, creating a strong attachment to HT.  As 
one novice observed, “we’d do data (spread HT ideology) and then we’d 
chill…there is a collective spirt we have.”  As with all group dynamics, the 
peer group indoctrinated a deep sense of group identification among the 
novices.  In sum, the novice sought identification with the peer group for 
the following reasons: (1) membership provided benefit; (2) it offered 
distinctiveness from other social groups; (3) there was a sense of common 
experience.66   
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When an individual joins HT, they are deliberately engineered towards 
conformity.  This pressure is exhibited, in the first instance, by assuming 
the role of novice.  This initial stage of interaction with HT gradually 
brings their behavior into alignment with the norms of HT.  Most 
importantly, HT exploits the need to belong within the novice, providing 
him or her with a feeling of self-importance by conveying a new cognitive 
worldview.  As the radicalization process deepens, the novice is gradually 
conditioned to accept the moral supremacy of HT ideology.  This is clear 
from the comments made by Farid, concerning the need for the individual 
to embody HT ideology in all aspects of his or her life, as he states:  
 
“The power of the ideology attracted us to the party, and 
I felt that power when I used to visit other people’s 
circles and meetings.  You just felt this incredible 
confidence, not arrogance, but confidence.  The truth is 
arrogant, so you feel this power and that’s never gone 
away from me, twenty years plus now.”67    
 
This view indicates how the individual grows to depend on HT, inspiring 
loyalty and long-term commitment.  Shaw makes a similar assessment of 
membership in a terrorist organization, as the group “often provides a 
solution to the pressing personal needs” that is not achieved in the wider 
society.68  This offers the individual a new identity and a role in society, 
albeit a negative one, which in a passive sense imposes conformity.  This is 
equally true for members of HT, as they cannot envisage life outside of HT. 
 
Conclusion  
The 1980s marked a pivotal period in the development of HT, as they 
deliberately targeted the Muslim youth.  It was on these grounds we 
decided to approach the question of how HT radicalization functions.  I 
have discovered HT radicalization to be a narrow and distinct psychosocial 
phenomenon with identifiable patterns related to controlling an 
individual’s behavior.  Radicalization is not simply an individualistic 
process; rather, it is embedded in a group context that exerts influence 
over the individual.   
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir indoctrinates the novice with a distinct ideological 
worldview, shaping how the novice perceives and interacts with the social 
world.  The inculcation of HT ideology occurs in the closed group setting of 
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the Halaqah.  Hizb ut-Tahrir describes this activity as an intellectual 
exercise, but as a political movement, they seek social change and this 
requires ideologically trained activists.  The Halaqah is the central 
instrument employed to inculcate HT ideology.  As Passmore declares, 
radicalization is a “special form of drilling in,” which in the case of HT 
entails ‘drilling’ HT ideology within the novice.69  
 
The function of the Halaqah is to inculcate the novice with HT ideology.  
Initially, this entails engineering a new cognitive outlook.  The Halaqah as 
a change agent is a life-long technique employed by HT to reinforce HT 
ideology for the entire lifespan of the novice.  However, the Halaqah does 
not end with membership, as all activists perpetually receive weekly 
Halaqah.  This prolonged radicalization method allows the novice to 
navigate the paradoxes of the outside world.  As the novice re-enters 
society, they encounter ideas that challenge their newly adopted ideology.  
Attending the weekly Halaqah allows the novice to align their social 
experiences with HT ideology, providing the novice with a constant point 
of reference. 
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